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Abstract. This article provides an in-depth study and critique of the nomina-
tion and inscription of an item on UNESCO’s lists of intangible cultural heritage 
and the developments following its acceptance. China is now a major partner 
in UNESCO’s heritage projects, but the application and experience of heritage 
initiatives across China have been highly uneven. I discuss the particular chal-
lenges presented in the contested, predominantly Muslim Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region. I focus on the question of community, a term that lies at 
the heart of the UNESCO literature. What do we mean by community, and why 
do we think it matters? How does socially embedded music-making facilitate 
community, and how do heritage initiatives change that?
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In 2010 China successfully submitted three more items to UNESCO’s fast-growing list of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding. 
Among them was the Uyghur meshrep (mäshräp), an item whose inscription I 
was involved with in the role of expert evaluator for UNESCO (Seeger 2009).1 
Mäshräp can be found on the UNESCO website, described in the following 
terms: “a rich collection of traditions and performance arts, such as music, dance, 
drama, folk arts, acrobatics, oral literature, foodways and games. . . . Meshrep 
functions both as a ‘court,’ where the host mediates conflicts and ensures the 
preservation of moral standards, and as a ‘classroom,’ where people can learn 
about their traditional customs.”2
 During the next few years, representations of this cultural practice achieved 
remarkable prominence in the public arena in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autono-
mous Region (XUAR). Xinjiang’s song-and-dance troupes developed staged 
versions of mäshräp, which were screened monthly on Xinjiang’s TV stations. 
Academic and popular publications on mäshräp in both the Uyghur and Chinese 
languages and box sets of DVDs were sold in the region’s official bookshops. 
The label “mäshräp” was used to market a range of venues and commodities 
from restaurants to household appliances to toilet paper, part of the “halo effect” 
of UNESCO recognition noted by Tim Taylor (2017:153). Such developments 
indicate not only strong state support but also a surge of Uyghur national pride 
in this tradition. But what has the impact of this safeguarding initiative been on 
its ostensible target: grassroots mäshräp practices among Uyghur communities? 
In this article, I discuss my experience of mäshräp prior to its inscription as an 
item of intangible cultural heritage in urgent need of safeguarding, the dilemmas 
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Music and Community
The term “community” is perhaps most commonly used to refer to immediate, 
lived social relations and is opposed to the larger notion of “society,” but none 
of these terms are easily defined or bounded. Anthropologists suggest that com-
munity does not map simply onto a geographical place; instead, it is a process, 
a series of everyday practices engaged in by a group of people. Communities 
also participate in wider social fields and are caught up in flows of capital and 
state power. Much critiqued in recent years, the term—as Kay Shelemay has 
argued—has been “frozen at the juncture of competing theories of location, 
mobility, identity, and politics, becoming in the process so ambiguous that to 
use the term is to be confronted with the necessity to argue for its use” (She-
lemay 2011:9). As Brett Williams notes, usages of community today might entail 
anything from categories of difference to transnational practices, from political 
consciousness to rallying around cultural symbols: “No matter what kind of com-
munity a community is, it is always a claim, a fiction, inscribed through symbols, 
ceremony, food, or a set of practices. It is almost always a site of disengagement 
and struggle as well as attachment and belonging” (2002:348).
 Vered Amit and Nigel Rapport (2012:3, 14) argue that this ambiguity in the 
idea of community is productive. They critique the tendency in the anthropo-
logical literature that situates community in the extraordinary (Victor Turner’s 
[1969] “communitas”) and emphasize community as an idea (Benedict Ander-
son’s [1991] “imagined communities”), a tendency that takes away from its 
usefulness as a framework for interrogating substantive social relations. Amit 
and Rapport propose a new framework for approaching community, one that 
emphasizes community as a distributive model of belonging and affect. This 
model is helpful when we think about the role that expressive culture might 
play in producing and sustaining community.
 Shelemay calls for a specifically musical rethinking of the notion of com-
munity in order to explore musical transmission and performance as “an integral 
part of processes that can at different moments help generate, shape, and sustain 
new collectivities” (2011:1). Notions of community, and the role of music in 
sustaining it, are in fact central to many mainstream statements in ethnomusi-
cology. Thomas Turino, for example, notes the special properties of music and 
dance that make them fundamental resources for connecting communities. 
These properties allow people to
intimately feel themselves part of the community through the realization of shared 
cultural knowledge and style and through the very act of participating together in 
performance. Music and dance are key to identity formation because they are often 
a public presentation of the deepest feelings and qualities that make a group unique. 
Through moving and sounding together in synchrony, people can experience a 
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feeling of oneness with others. The signs of this social intimacy are experienced di-
rectly—body to body—and thus in the moment are felt to be true. (Turino 2008:2–3)
 In a similar vein, Jeff Todd Titon (2015) proposes the notion of a “sound 
community” to refer to a community established and maintained by acoustic 
communication and also by extension a healthy and resilient community. For 
Titon, copresence in sound is intersubjective and relational, a subject-to-subject 
resonant and reciprocal way of knowing, participatory and exchanged freely, 
and this is central to its role in strengthening and sustaining communities. This 
mines a rich vein of utopian thinking in ethnomusicology, but it also dovetails 
neatly with more recent moves in anthropology that suggest how a focus more 
broadly on the sensorium may help to answer Shelemay’s call, bringing recent 
moves in ethnomusicology together with developments in anthropology. In his 
study of temple fairs in rural China, Adam Chau, for example, emphasizes the 
active participatory role of social agents in the sensory production of sociality. 
Chau argues for a sensory-production model of analysis that foregrounds the 
active participatory role of social agents in producing a sensorily rich social 
world: “We may come to understand how people in a particular culture know 
and are in the world through the senses, but there has been little explicit atten-
tion to the active participatory role of human agents themselves in producing 
the said sensory stimuli” (2008:488). In this view, sensorily rich activities like 
joking, playing games, and musicking are always social and relational. They 
coproduce a sensorialized sociality shared and enjoyed by all who are present, 
creating rich experiences of community in the moment of performance. This 
approach to sociality is key to understanding the way that music-making is 
embedded in a wider range of activities and experiences produced during a 
mäshräp and to understanding the role of Uyghur mäshräp in producing and 
sustaining community.
Uyghur Communities
We may view the Uyghurs as one of China’s officially recognized minority 
nationalities alongside, for example, the Tibetans or Mongols or, alternatively, 
as one of the Central Asian nationalities (nations) alongside, for example, the 
Uzbeks and Tajiks, the only one of these nations that does not possess its own 
independent nation-state.3 Culturally, the Uyghurs are Central Asian, but their 
homeland lies within the borders of the People’s Republic of China in the large 
desert and mountainous region of northwestern China widely known as Xinji-
ang. Uyghurs follow Sunni Islam of a kind strongly influenced by Sufi traditions, 
especially practices of shrine pilgrimage and forms of sama’ ritual gathering.4 
They are speakers of a Turkic language that is closely related to Uzbek, and 
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Uyghur musical traditions are closely related to the neighboring musical cultures 
of Central Asia. Some eleven million Uyghurs live in Xinjiang, according to the 
latest census, and there are also sizable populations in the neighboring Central 
Asian states of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, as well as in Turkey, 
Europe, America, and Australia.
 The term “community” is most closely translated in Uyghur as jäma’ät, which 
suggests primarily the mosque community, a hierarchical system dominated by 
respected and pious older men. This overlaps with geographical units, the vil-
lage (yeza) or neighborhood (mähällä), and the dense networks of reciprocity 
(hospitality, sharing food, mutual assistance) that are actively maintained by 
women with their neighbors and extended family (Bellér-Hann 2008). Uyghur 
communities in Xinjiang have experienced significant levels of change, mobil-
ity, and rupture over the past century: unrest and war, incorporation into the 
People’s Republic of China in 1955, land reforms and communization, the rise of 
an educated middle class and ethnic nationalism, and the chaos of the Cultural 
Revolution (Bovingdon 2010; Brophy 2016). Peasants regained some control over 
their land in the 1980s, but a heavily interventionist state apparatus continues to 
dictate what crops are grown and requires them to engage in the khasha (compul-
sory labor; see Bellér-Hann 1997). The large-scale development and urbanization 
of the 1990s impelled a massive influx of Han migrants into the region; Uyghurs 
now comprise just over 50 percent of the total population of Xinjiang, according 
to the latest census. Development and urbanization also impelled significant 
Uyghur rural-to-urban migration and sometimes the wholesale movement of 
local communities to new sites to facilitate development projects (Bellér-Hann 
2014). Alongside these changes impelled by development and urbanization, 
an Islamic revival also began to grow in force in the 1990s (Harris 2013; Smith 
Finley 2013), and Uyghur villagers began to engage in the construction of new 
forms of community that were often transnational and technologically mediated 
(Harris and Isa 2011). State attempts to counter this rise in religious piety and 
closer links between Uyghurs and the Middle East took the form of a series of 
increasingly repressive and violent “antiextremism campaigns,” which progres-
sively banned mainstream forms of religious expression and practice, including 
reading religious books (including the Qur’an), religious styles of clothing, the 
Ramadan fast, daily prayers, and mosque attendance. These policies triggered a 
series of violent incidents that China’s state media was quick to label as extremist 
terror (Roberts 2018). This culminated in the declaration of the “People’s War 
on Terror” in 2016, which introduced unprecedented levels of surveillance and 
detention, with an estimated 1.1 million Uyghurs incarcerated in “reeducation 
centers” at the time of writing.5 Alongside these policies, the local authorities 
also introduced forms of “reeducation” for the wider Uyghur population that 
included compulsory singing and dancing sessions designed to “counter extrem-
ism” (Harris 2017).
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 In short, Uyghur communities are precarious and in a state of flux. Their 
current situation has become critical, but throughout the twentieth century 
they have engaged in a constant process of rebuilding and reformulating in 
the face of rapid social and economic change, incorporating new practices and 
reimagining established practices of sociality, always in negotiation with state 
policies. Amid all this rapid change, Uyghurs have maintained forms of com-
munity primarily in the form of social ties sustained through hospitality and 
celebrations, including weddings, circumcision parties, and (when permitted) 
religious festivals. Mäshräp, as we will see, play a prominent role both in modern 
imaginings of Uyghur identity and tradition and in these more fundamental 
processes of community-making. Mäshräp are sites for acts of reciprocity and 
for the transmission of social rules and norms, but they are also contexts within 
which community is enacted through forms of expressive culture, including 
music and dance.
Local Traditions of Mäshräp
A diverse set of social contexts and meanings is subsumed under the term 
mäshräp. Among Uyghur men from the Ili valley in the northwest of Xinjiang, 
monthly mäshräp gatherings, structured around musical performance, stories 
and jokes, and informal court hearings, have been the expression of lasting 
social bonds between groups of men who are termed the ottuz oghul (thirty 
sons). The mäshräp held in the town of Ghulja in the mid-twentieth century 
nurtured a group of musicians who would be instrumental in formalizing the 
national repertoire of Uyghur music. According to singer Gheyazdin Barat (d. 
2000), members gathered in a family home and took turns to host the mäshräp. 
Musicians were always invited; the host would give them a gift of clothes or cloth, 
and dancers placed money in a tray set in front of the musicians. There should 
be three periods of dancing in the course of a mäshräp, one time to listen to the 
muqam, one time for stories and jokes, one time for songs, and one time for 
quiet when members could report which of their peers had committed some 
fault. The punishments were severe, he said, and people usually only had to be 
punished once (Gheyazdin Barat, interview with the author, April 1999).
 The Ili mäshräp served to teach the rules of communal behavior to young 
men and enforced them through the mäshräp’s informal court. They also served 
as a way to perform and transmit expressive culture and communal knowledge. 
They were “a rite of passage into manhood, a vehicle for teaching and regulating 
moral, religious, and social etiquette, and a means of forming male peer groups” 
(Roberts 1998:675). Uyghurs in the Ili valley use the phrase “mäshräpni kör-
migän bala” (a boy who has not seen a mäshräp) to refer to a young man who is 
deemed uncouth. When a young man is first introduced into a mäshräp group, 
his father or representative says to the ottuz oghul, “The boy’s skeleton is ours, 
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but his flesh is yours; teach him morals and manners, for I have brought him to 
the mäshräp” (682). This phrasing recalls rituals of apprenticeship, including 
musical apprenticeship, that were also exclusively male. This form of mäshräp 
was an exclusively gendered site for the production of communal masculinity, 
involving the acquisition and exercise of power, responsibility, and mutual aid.
 These Ili mäshräp have been a major force in retaining Uyghur identity and 
culture in the diaspora. In 2003 in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek, I attended a 
mäshräp held by a group of migrants who came from Ghulja in the early 1960s. 
This group of ottuz oghul claimed proudly that they had held their mäshräp 
continuously for forty years. They maintained the traditional rules, presided 
over by the yigit beshi (leader of the lads) and qazi (judge), and administered 
punishments such as the “surutini tamghur tartish” (shadow on the wall, dur-
ing which water is thrown over the guilty party). The yigit beshi and qazi were 
also the leading musicians in the group and played muqam on violin and dutar. 
Their wives and children labored over the immense meal inside the house and 
appeared only to serve the food, but feminine representations were not absent 
from the performance; one of the ottuz oghul gave a spirited demonstration of 
a coquettish dance complete with a tea bowl balanced on his head.
 In southern Xinjiang, the fixed mäshräp fraternity structure of the ottuz 
oghul is not practiced; instead, mäshräp are organized along the lines of hospital-
ity and reciprocity that more generally characterize social relations in Uyghur 
society. Ildikó Bellér-Hann describes mäshräp as “the institutionalized enact-
ment of community itself; through the transmission of rules between genera-
tions young people were taught how to be social, how to submit to the rules of 
the community” (2008:215). In the south, women and men actively participate 
in mäshräp. As in the Ili valley, games, music, and dancing are central, and the 
mäshräp also serves as an informal community court, which here again is often 
officiated by the musicians. In a Dolan Uyghur village near Kashgar, I attended a 
mäshräp where the musicians played the role of clowns at the same time as they 
meted out justice.6 Lapses in morality were punished by ritual humiliation, to 
the delight of the crowd. Here too I found gender reversal for comic effect: one 
man was “fined” for flirting by being “married to two wives” in the form of two 
mincing musicians in women’s head scarves who lay on each side of him on a 
makeshift bed in the middle of the dance arena and took turns smacking his 
face.7 The gathering culminated with a distinctive competitive whirling circle 
dance from which dancers gradually dropped out, tired or dizzy, until one win-
ner was left in the arena performing high victory leaps.
 This Dolan mäshräp was clearly a thriving, locally maintained tradition, 
though already managed to some degree by the local authorities. Häkhät Tokhti, 
who played the Dolan rawap lute and acted as chief clown, told me in 2000 that 
they were playing at four or five mäshräp in a week. He also farmed a plot of 
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land, growing “whatever the authorities tell me to grow,” but his music was an 
important source of income. A group could earn 200 to 300 RMB (equivalent 
to a week’s wages) at a mäshräp, depending on how many people attended; as 
Gheyazdin Barat also reported in Ili, the money is given to the musicians by the 
dancers. Another important benefit for the musicians was that they could avoid 
the khasha obligatory labor. Instead, musicians could be called on at any time 
by the local authorities to play for visiting officials and guests (Häkhät Tokhti, 
interview with the author, Yantaq, July 2000).
 Since 2010, this particular village mäshräp and its related musical tradition, 
the Dolan Muqam, has become the object of extraordinary promotion (figure 
2).8 Some of the musicians who performed there now teach and perform with 
the Xinjiang song-and-dance troupe; they feature in several Uyghur pop music 
videos; their performance of the Dolan Muqam has been published in multiple 
forms within China and released on CD by the French label Inedit; their mäshräp 
have been filmed and recorded perhaps hundreds of times and are frequently 
shown on regional and national Chinese television; and they have performed 
in concert halls and music festivals around the world. How did this all come 
about?
Figure 2. Singing the 
Dolan Muqam at a 
mäshräp. Courtesy of 
Rahile Dawut.
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Intangible Cultural Heritage in China
The dizzying set of life changes undergone by those musicians began in 2005 
when “The Art of Uyghur Muqam in Xinjiang” appeared on UNESCO’s List of 
Masterpieces of the Intangible Heritage of Humanity, a program subsequently 
superseded by a set of new lists: the Representative List and the List for Urgent 
Safeguarding, on which the “Uyghur Meshrep” appears (Seeger 2009; Foster 
2015). This period marked the beginning of a new discourse in Xinjiang under 
which selected traditional cultural practices were reframed as intangible cultural 
heritage. This discourse drew on the guidelines developed by UNESCO and was 
mediated by the existing Chinese discourses on “national traditions.”
 The Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage was 
adopted by UNESCO in 2003 after many years of negotiations and expert consul-
tations, the most recent in a long series of UNESCO policies concerning heritage 
both “tangible” and “intangible” (Foster 2015). It aimed to accord greater value 
to cultural traditions and practices, among them music, festivals, rituals, and 
cultural spaces, characterized in UNESCO literature as “fragile and perishable 
but essential for communities’ cultural identity.” Under this carefully devised 
and hotly negotiated framework (Seeger 2009), heritage was regarded not as 
fixed and static tradition but as something permanently evolving, encompass-
ing not only rural traditions but also urban and hybrid cultures. The guidelines 
placed emphasis on the individuals who embody the skills and techniques that 
maintain the traditions and the communities in which they participate. Earlier 
models of approaches to heritage developed in Japan and Korea were influen-
tial on this new UNESCO formulation (Howard 2012). The program sought to 
raise awareness and recognize the importance of intangible heritage, and it also 
stressed the need to safeguard and revitalize that heritage. Each submission for 
heritage status should include an action plan for revitalization, safeguarding, 
and promotion; the plan will be scrutinized by UNESCO-appointed experts and 
assessed by an international jury.9
 China participated enthusiastically in the process from the start, and a sub-
stantial academic literature devoted to “heritage with Chinese characteristics” 
is now available (Silverman and Blumenfield 2013; Kuah and Liu 2017; Svens-
son and Maags 2018). By 2017 a total of thirty-nine Chinese items had been 
inscribed on the various UNESCO lists, while China’s own list of national-level 
intangible heritage items ran to an impressive 2,438 items.10 In Xinjiang, these 
include the Kyrgyz Manas epic, the Kazakh dombra, and the “Tajik” game of 
buzkashi, among many others.11 Across China, local efforts to get cultural items 
included on the national list produced an upsurge in surveys, training handbooks 
and classes, and archiving initiatives. Successful applications were rewarded 
with generous state funding for preservation plans, which included research, 
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archiving, conferences and publication, and stipends for designated represen-
tative transmitters to transmit their art (Rees 2012:31). Daily media attention 
was devoted to the subject, specialist magazines were published, and there was 
widespread interest and debate among cultural practitioners, local bureaucrats, 
and commentators. The enormous enthusiasm for intangible cultural heritage 
displayed by Chinese government organs and state media suggests that as early 
as 2005 it had become a major plank of cultural policy. Commentators have 
argued that this new role as protector of national heritage formed a part of 
the Chinese Communist Party’s search for new forms of legitimacy beyond 
communism. It was, of course, an extraordinary historical shift away from the 
massive destruction of heritage under the policies of the revolutionary era just 
a few decades earlier (Chang 2017).
 In other ways, however, there was considerable continuity with the practices 
of the revolutionary era. The aesthetic norms of professional, staged folkloric 
performance established in the mid-twentieth century have continued to domi-
nate representations of intangible heritage in twenty-first-century China. Isabel 
Wong writes that the 2001 listing of Kunqu opera on the UNESCO Masterpieces 
List was taken as “official encouragement to give Kunqu a globalized veneer. . . . 
[N]ew and lavish stage productions were produced with simple stories or little
singing, but with lots of action, to attract foreign audiences in China and abroad” 
(2009:31). When the Uyghur Muqam joined Kunqu opera on the UNESCO
Masterpieces List in 2005, although the nomination file devoted considerable
attention to locally maintained traditions, in practice, staged performances
by the Muqam Ensemble and Xinjiang song-and-dance troupe continued to
dominate the national sphere, while the “representative transmitters” of regional 
Muqam traditions were extracted from their local communities and brought
to Ürümchi to participate in the work of transforming their own repertoire
and practice to conform to the aesthetic framework of the established troupes
(Harris 2008).
In terms of the political agenda too, statements issuing from central govern-
ment suggest much continuity with established agendas behind the promotion 
of folk art, with a notable shift away from UNESCO’s emphasis on communities 
toward national identity and national unity, as an important 2006 speech at a 
Beijing exhibition made clear: “The protection of intangible cultural heritage and 
maintaining continuity of the national culture constitute an essential cultural 
base for enhancing cohesion of the nation, boosting national unity, invigorat-
ing the national spirit, and safeguarding national unification.”12 Jung-a Chang 
(2017:121) also describes how Chinese theories of heritage align with current 
political campaigns, highlighting, for example, the contributions of intangible 
cultural heritage to the “harmonious society” (a key slogan during the 2000s) 
and the possibilities for its use as an educational tool for fostering patriotism. 
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Official support for cultural heritage generally centers on the elements that are 
most directly aligned with party priorities (Silverman and Blumenfield 2013:4).
 Heritage, not only in China but throughout the world, is a tool of gover-
nance. It can be used to control and manage tradition, cultural practices, and 
religion and to steer people’s memories, sense of place, and identities in particular 
ways, providing a softer and less visible way of rendering individuals govern-
able (Svensson and Maags 2018). There is substantial investment in heritage at 
all levels of society and government in China. The national government sees 
participation in the heritage domain as an aspect of soft power on the national 
and international stages; county governments see heritage as economic capital, 
especially in its potential to attract tourism; and local actors invest strongly in 
intangible heritage as social and cultural capital (Kuah and Liu 2017:6). As this 
last point suggests, a narrow emphasis on government policy cannot fully explain 
the massive popularity of this initiative and the radical shift in public attitudes 
it has entailed, from the position in the 1980s where Chinese cultural traditions 
were routinely disregarded or denigrated to what Helen Rees terms a “juggernaut 
of initiatives and impassioned calls for protection” (2012:53). The widespread 
change in attitudes can be linked to the upsurge in Chinese nationalism and 
competitiveness at the international and regional levels but also to the sense of 
cultural dislocation and nostalgia engendered by China’s rapid urbanization 
and social development (Rees 2016; Chang 2017). The government’s nationalist 
rhetoric and rediscovery of heritage sites and practices find a deep resonance 
among many people in China who are troubled by a perceived erosion of social 
values and cultural traditions (Svensson and Maags 2018:14).
 There is ample scope for disconnect between UNESCO—that massive inter-
national organization headquartered in Paris—and the small disparate commu-
nities scattered across the globe that are targeted by its efforts and affected by its 
decisions. Michael Foster (2015:143–44) has argued that UNESCO’s metacultural 
policies often become a testing ground for negotiations between the global and 
the local. Studies of heritage in China have begun to pay attention to the ways 
in which local residents participate in, respond to, and even manage to shape 
cultural policies within their own communities, often against the backdrop of 
a very top-down official framework (Kuah and Liu 2017). Case studies (You 
2015; Liu 2017; Ong 2018) suggest the very heated nature of these debates and 
disagreements and the very uneven terrain in terms of the possibilities for nego-
tiation. Marina Svensson and Christina Maags (2018) note the great diversity 
encompassed in discussions of heritage in China in terms of regional, cultural, 
and ethnic differences, as well as the significant gaps between “heritage profes-
sionals” and the general public. A key question in studying Chinese approaches 
to heritage is to consider the relative possibilities for negotiation and contestation 
over heritage to flourish in different regions at different historical moments.
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Minority Nationalities and Intangible Cultural Heritage
Ethnic minority cultural practices, especially musical genres, have featured dis-
proportionately in China’s selected masterpieces: thirteen of the thirty-nine items 
on UNESCO’s lists. This emphasis reflects the long-standing prominence and 
political manipulation of minority arts in Chinese national culture, as well as 
the geographical position of minority peoples in regions whose regional govern-
ments see tourism as a vital part of their development strategies (Svensson and 
Maags 2018). Some commentators have been quick to note how the Chinese 
promotion of minority traditions stresses their “inalienable identity” as a part 
of China and suggest that China’s preference for promoting intangible heritage 
items as symbols of identity was because their meanings and presentation were 
easier to manipulate and control than those of physical heritage sites.13 Helaine 
Silverman and Tami Blumenfield (2013:8) argue that the chief goal of China’s 
heritage and tourism policies is to incorporate minority ethnic regions more 
firmly into China. While cultural policies promote minority distinctiveness, the 
state is both vigilant and active in suppressing those whom it views as threaten-
ing the unity of the nation or its goals of modernization. Other observers take a 
more optimistic view. Rees, for example, notes the transformation of the Naxi 
Dongba ritual in Yunnan as the official view of this practice shifted from “feu-
dal superstition” to “cultural asset.” Government officials stopped harassing its 
practitioners and began enthusiastically promoting its inclusion in international 
festivals (Rees 2012:43; see also McKhann 2010). More common is for the ritu-
als to undergo a “heritagization process” through which they are reconstructed 
and reinterpreted, often with their religious aspects downplayed or ignored 
(Svensson and Maags 2018:19).
 An ethnographic study of the impact of heritage programs on Kam (Dongzu) 
society in southwestern China is instructive (Ingram et al. 2011). In recent years, 
Kam Grand Song (Dongzu da’ge, polyphonic song traditions of the Kam people) 
has been heavily promoted as an item of intangible heritage and brought into 
the sphere of staged performances for tourists, national media, and international 
tours. Ingram argues that the initiative was undertaken without appropriate con-
sultation and has encouraged the commoditization of the song culture: “Many 
Kam women are aware of the ways that the cultural development of staged Kam 
song performances essentializes and exoticizes Kam people, and know that Kam 
people’s participation in staged song performances brings certain political and 
economic benefits to state agencies without always directly benefitting the Kam 
people involved. However, women still collaborate in the performances for other 
strategic reasons, such as to increase their own cultural, symbolic and economic 
capital within the local arena” (Ingram et al. 2011:80). While there is no indica-
tion that its design was actually intended to do so, cultural development has in 
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practice led to greater agency for these women. Case studies such as this remind 
us that the heritage projects cannot be seen as inherently beneficial processes, 
but neither should ethnic minority practitioners be seen as powerless in their 
participation within them.
Mäshräp: The Inscription Process
An account of the application process published on the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences website lays out a detailed hierarchy of responsibility for the 
application:
On 8 March 2009 the Ministry of Culture of the People’s Republic of China submitted 
China’s Xinjiang Uyghur mäshräp to UNESCO’s list of Intangible Cultural Heritage 
in Need of Urgent Safeguarding. Prior to this, the vice chairman of the Eighth and 
Ninth NPC, Tomur Dawamat, the Ministry of Culture of the State Council, the 
Central People’s Broadcasting Station, CCTV, many media reporters, the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region party and government leaders, the director of the 
Xinjiang Cultural Bureau, Abulizi Abudureyimu, and the team that had primary 
responsibility for the Xinjiang mäshräp inscription work made unremitting efforts 
and hard work, received strong support from the party committee, government, 
and all the peoples of Xinjiang, and made an indelible contribution to the mäshräp 
inscription work.14
In other words, this project was about as top-down as it gets; but also, signifi-
cantly, it was driven and implemented predominantly by Uyghurs. Tomur Dawa-
mat, chairman of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region from 1985 to 1993, 
had nurtured this project since participating in an ICH Congress in Beijing in 
2003. Under his leadership, a series of archiving and publication initiatives were 
set in motion that would pave the way for the state submission to UNESCO. A 
mäshräp rescue team was established with the purpose of carrying out rescue 
and safeguarding measures, including the nomination of three local mäshräp 
traditions for inscription on the national list. Xinjiang media increased their 
coverage of mäshräp, and Xinjiang’s universities listed mäshräp among their 
designated research subjects.
 The Xinjiang ICH Protection Center played a significant role in the pro-
cess. This organization grew out of the Xinjiang Arts Research Unit, which was 
responsible for the Xinjiang part of the 1980s government initiative to docu-
ment the musical traditions of the nation in the massive multivolume series, The 
Anthology of Chinese Folk Music.15 Under this project, its researchers traveled 
across the Xinjiang region, recording and interviewing musicians. They spear-
headed the earlier successful submission of the Muqam to UNESCO, and they 
were a natural choice to be involved in this new submission. Uyghur academics 
were also drawn into the process, publishing a series of fieldwork-based accounts 
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of mäshräp in Chinese (Maimaiti 2006) and Uyghur (Abliz 2009; Dawut and 
Muhpul 2011).
 On the basis of this accumulated knowledge and coordinating with local 
cultural offices, the submission work group set about planning the principal 
publication for their initiative: a set of thirty-one films of local mäshräp (Junggu 
2008). These films are fascinating texts. Each selected locality brought out the 
best of its expressive culture for inclusion in the mäshräp project, including 
performances by the local cultural troupe, comedians, storytellers, and village 
musicians and dancers. They include some wonderful examples of local expres-
sive culture—leper theatrical skits involving comical cross-dressers, a whirling 
sama’ dance accompanied by some fascinating rhythms beaten out on huge 
frame drums, the extraordinary pantomime of the ghaz usuli (goose dance)—
all rubbing up against some terrible staged kitsch. These disparate items were 
stitched together to conform to a loose mäshräp structure designed to fit each 
forty-five-minute video, including staged court hearings and comical punish-
ment scenes.
 The videos are clearly scripted and rehearsed. They are filmed in a variety 
of settings, often against what seem to be specially constructed theater sets. The 
videos juxtapose professional with local amateur performances, sometimes to 
the extent that the visual shots of massed crowds of local musicians are overlaid 
with more “refined” studio recordings by the professional troupes. In this way, 
each of the thirty-one designated local mäshräp was fixed and given a unique 
appropriate name with local significance and its own overarching unique identi-
fying characteristic. According to the state submission, “The Namakul [Apology] 
Maxirap [Mäshräp] is held to mediate conflicts or settle disputes; the Keiyet [Dis-
ciplinary] Maxirap is performed with the aim of criticizing immoral behaviors 
or educating the public; the Dolan Maxirap is meant to show admiration for the 
hunting life and bravery of the ancestors; and the Ketaphan [Storytelling] Maxi-
rap serves as a sort of review of literature.”16 The process of producing mäshräp 
for submission to UNESCO recalls in many ways the processes of canonization 
of the Uyghur Muqam that preceded it. I read these films as acts of bricolage, 
which, as Philip Bohlman (1988) has aptly said, precede and enable projects of 
enshrining “things that people do” as “national culture.”
 Video clips were selected from the thirty-one DVDs for inclusion in the 
draft submission to UNESCO. Along with all the other items intended for sub-
mission in that year, they underwent a process of consultation at the national 
level. The Beijing-based heritage experts at the China Academy of Arts evidently 
shared some of my own reservations regarding the videos: “On 20 December 
2008 experts on the National Expert Committee reviewed the material and 
made several recommendations. The experts considered that the submission 
video was too obviously staged, the participants were too obviously wearing 
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makeup, the scenery was too flashy, and overall the content was too similar to 
the submission for the Uyghur Muqam.”17 More attuned to the sensibilities that 
prevailed in UNESCO, the Beijing experts counseled a less obviously packaged 
and glossy presentation, but this advice was at odds with the dominant sensibili-
ties in Xinjiang: as an item of culture that was to represent China’s Uyghurs to 
the world, the mäshräp should look “developed” and “beautiful.” Raw “peasant” 
culture was not fit to represent the Uyghur nation on the international stage.
 Armed with these video productions, the mäshräp work team set to work 
to produce its written submission to UNESCO. The account of this process on 
the CASS website describes their anxieties over finding a suitable definition of 
mäshräp: how to strike the right balance between diversity and construct a clearly 
defined “item” for submission. The process of defining a distinct pan-Uyghur 
category of mäshräp, as opposed to other types of festive gathering, required 
some care.
 In historical and contemporary accounts, mäshräp practices overlap with 
other named forms of gatherings: mäjlis (meetings) and bäzmä (feasts). The early 
twentieth-century missionary scholar Gunnar Jarring provides a description of 
the Snow Game, played after the first snow of the season, when a person would 
hide a written verse in a friend’s home. If the friend found the verse before the 
person got back home, the author would be punished by being dressed as a 
woman and paraded around the streets; if he could not, then his friend must 
host a bäzmä. I have encountered similar games played among the Uyghur 
diaspora in the UK but termed Qar (Snow) Mäshräp. The celebration of spring 
in Qumul, today formalized among the thirty-one mäshräp as the Kök Mäshräp, 
is described in a 1930s Russian source as the Kök Mäjlis. Mäshräp may also refer 
to healing rituals: a 1950s source from Aqsu describes a Piri Mäshräp (pir may be 
glossed as “shaman” or “ritual healer”). Among the Dolan Uyghurs, a wedding 
party could also be termed mäshräp. In the early twentieth century, the term 
also referred to regular banquets organized on a rotating basis by members of 
guilds (Bellér-Hann 2008:210–14).
 In their more informal incarnations, mäshräp also display considerable 
overlap with gatherings called olturush. In Ghulja in the mid-1990s, olturush 
took the form of men’s drinking parties, held in the home or parks. According 
to Jay Dautcher’s (2009:143–47) rich ethnography, these gatherings were the 
most important events in the day-to-day lives of many men in Ghulja. Men 
might attend several olturush in a week; they lasted six to ten hours and were 
rich in expressive culture, primarily joking and music. Like the mäshräp, they 
were subject to rules and were hosted by a saqiy, who served as leader, resolved 
any disputes, and poured the alcohol. Dautcher argues that they provided a path 
to establishing and maintaining social status in the local community. Diversity 
is key to understanding these practices: “This uncertain definition of the term, 
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which ranged from male socializing to religious assemblies including Sufi and 
other rituals, suggests that all these forms of sociability shared a number of 
features. . . . The term was so versatile because it indicated communal occasions 
of all sorts which remained outside the realm of ‘mainstream’ life-cycle and 
religious celebrations” (Bellér-Hann 2008:214).
Healthy and Unhealthy Mäshräp
The mäshräp submission to UNESCO was evidently based on excellent research 
and detailed local knowledge of mäshräp traditions around the region. But it is 
worth considering what aspects of these traditions are not foregrounded in the 
state submission. Mäshräp as a name also is shared by a seventeenth-century 
mystic poet, Bābā Rahīm Mashrab (Shah Mäshräp in the Uyghur pronunciation), 
who is a central figure in popular Sufism in Central Asia. Mashrab was a Sufi 
mystic poet, a qalandar who publicly violated conventional morality in order to 
bring people to a mystical understanding of God, one who transcended super-
ficial obedience to doctrinal rules and knowledge of external appearances. The 
story of his life is contained in the Dīvāna-i Mashrab (Mashrab the madman), a 
set of stories and poems that circulated widely in written and oral forms across 
the places where he traveled: the Ferghana Valley (in contemporary Uzbekistan) 
Figure 3. Dancing at a village mäshräp. Courtesy of Rahile Dawut.
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and Altishahr (the “six cities” that ring the Taklimakan desert in today’s southern 
Xinjiang). The pen name Mashrab, from the Arabic, means “place for drinking” 
and by extension came to mean a wellspring, particularly for Sufi inspiration. 
The contemporary usage of mäshräp as a term for gatherings and festivities 
may derive from and is certainly linked to Sufi gatherings (Light 2008:109–11). 
The word mäshräp also refers to a musical repertoire: the concluding section 
of the Twelve Muqam. This repertoire includes many songs that set the poems 
of Shah Mashrab. They form part of the repertoire of Sufi dervishes, known as 
ashiq or qalandar or sometimes as mäshräpchi, who perform them at shrine 
festivals, accompanying themselves on sapaya percussion sticks, surrounded 
by large crowds who listen to these performances as a way to acquire religious 
merit (Harris 2017).
 The centrality of Islamic culture within mäshräp practices is also evidenced 
in the religious stories and texts that were frequently read aloud at these gath-
erings. Dautcher (2009:270–71) cites an account of mäshräp from 1870 that 
included reading aloud stories from the lives of saints and other Islamic stories 
and legends. Bellér-Hann describes how “popular Islamic texts by Rabğuzī, Jāmī, 
and Firdawsī, and the works of mystic authors, especially Yasawī, his disciple 
Sulaymān Baqirgan and Sūfī Allāyār, as well as stories about the various exploits 
of Muslim heroes descended from the Prophet ‘Alī were recited. The recital was 
typically followed by dancing to musical accompaniment, which contributed 
to the Sufi character of such meetings, since similar dances were commonly 
performed by members of some brotherhoods” (2008:213).
 The state submission to UNESCO effectively cleansed mäshräp of the reli-
gious aspects of its practice, presenting a purely secular version of the tradition. 
This move was a direct continuation of established PRC policy and practice on 
folk art; the Uyghur Muqam was similarly cleansed of references to its Islamic 
heritage when it was submitted to UNESCO. But in the case of the mäshräp, 
this process of cleansing took place within an immediate political context where 
Islam was coming to the fore as a mechanism for the assertion of Uyghur identity 
and community in ways that clashed directly and sometimes violently with the 
Xinjiang authorities. Moreover, one set of mäshräp practices was already directly 
implicated in this context.
 The Ili mäshräp movement of the mid-1990s is characterized by Sean Rob-
erts (1998) and Dautcher (2009)—both of whom conducted extensive ethno-
graphic research with mäshräp participants—as an attempt by young Uyghur 
social activists to counter endemic problems of youth alcoholism, drug abuse, 
and crime through the propagation of a pious Muslim lifestyle. They arose in part 
in opposition to the well-established drinking culture of the olturush described 
above. These new Ili mäshräp displayed a great deal of continuity with the local 
tradition; they were organized around a fixed group of men, the ottuz oghul, 
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who met regularly to discuss community issues, to promote Islamic practice, 
to regulate members’ behavior, and to offer services to the community, such as 
gifts of cash or food to people in need. Punishments administered by the pash-
shap, typically for failure to maintain the regime of daily prayer or succumbing 
to peer pressure to drink alcohol, included räsim tartish (shadow on the wall 
[explained above]) but also beliq tutush (being forced to fish with the mouth for 
a heavy object in a pail of water), samsa berish (a slap on the face, just as a raw 
dumpling is slapped onto the side of the clay tonur oven), and ayropilan (being 
made to adopt the excruciating airplane posture, possibly a cultural borrowing 
from the struggle meetings of the Cultural Revolution; Dautcher 2009:273).
 In July 1995 a group of mäshräp leaders initiated a boycott on alcohol in the 
town of Ghulja. Local officials, who were either unhappy about the loss of rev-
enue for local state-run distilleries or feeling threatened by a form of community 
action they did not initiate, officially banned mäshräp gatherings. The movement, 
however, continued to flourish underground, with strong community support. 
In August 1995 mäshräp leaders organized a youth football league, again with 
a view to providing local youths with alternatives to drink, drugs, and crime. 
Teams were organized by the town neighborhood communities (mähällä) and 
became the object of much pride among residents. The authorities canceled the 
tournament and sent tanks to occupy the football field. Local residents marched 
past the field in a peaceful protest, and in response Ghulja was placed under 
martial law. Staged representations of mäshräp were already at this time being 
promoted within the tourism sector in Ili. They took the form, in Dautcher’s 
words, of “sites of leisure and frivolity replete with boisterous games, singing 
maidens, and laughing children.” In the aftermath of the demonstration, a filmed 
version of this state-promoted vision of mäshräp was screened on local TV, 
evidently with the intent “to present and promote a state-scripted meaning of 
mäshräp over the actual folk practice of the event” (Dautcher 2009:280).
 These events formed part of the build-up to the “Ghulja Incident” of 5 Feb-
ruary 1997, a day of intense protest and rioting, numerous arrests, and police 
shootings. The protestors marched in response to the announcement of a group 
of convictions on charges of extremism and separatism, and they reiterated 
their opposition to the banning of the mäshräp. They were condemned in Chi-
na’s state media as terrorists, and the state security forces were condemned by 
Amnesty International for gross violations of human rights, including the torture 
of detainees and large numbers of executions.18 In the immediate aftermath of 
the violence, Xinjiang People’s Congress chairman Amudin Niyaz released a 
statement:
Mäshräp is a popular activity among the Uyghurs. However, a handful of national 
separatists, in order to realize their ulterior motive, have manipulated this recre-
ation to establish illicit ties, using mäshräp as grounds for disseminating speeches, 
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undermining national unity and motherland unification, and carrying out illegal 
religious activities.
 This is absolutely not permissible. We must expose such tricks and conspiracies 
by refusing to participate in their kind of “mäshräp” and must crack down on such 
unlawful activity. Meanwhile, we must actively promote and organize the healthy, 
traditional mäshräp to enrich the masses’ cultural and recreational life and to praise 
our new life, thereby promoting the advancement of Uighur culture. (translated by 
Dautcher 2009:285)
How is the distinction between “healthy” and “unhealthy” mäshräp made? The 
issue is not one of whether the mäshräp include any “religious extremist” or 
“separatist” activities—always nebulous charges—but rather who is in charge. 
At the heart of this is the question of the state’s ability to tolerate free association 
and community-led initiatives in Xinjiang.
An Evaluator’s Dilemma
In 2009 I was invited by UNESCO to act as evaluator for the nomination file 
“Maxirap,” submitted by China.19 The file promised an action plan and consider-
able investment in safeguarding mäshräp, according to the following scheme:
1. To establish a mechanism for representative inheritors to safeguard and transmit 
mäshräp (1.2 million RMB)
2. Research and documentation (1.5 million RMB)
3. To establish zones of cultural preservation (4 million RMB)
4. To create a database (400,000 RMB)
5. To hold a conference (1.8 million RMB)
6. To train students in sustainable development (450,000 RMB)20
Evaluators are asked to produce a detailed report on the nomination files,
commenting on the viability of the nominated element and the feasibility and 
adequacy of the safeguarding plan, and a recommendation to the committee 
to inscribe or not to inscribe the nominated element. In view of the political 
context detailed above, the invitation posed a dilemma. Should the evaluator 
conclude that in such a context “safeguarding” this practice in the terms under-
stood in UNESCO policy was unfeasible, or should the evaluator take the view 
that it was better to work with the system and hope that local players might be 
able use the initiative to bring about measurable benefits on the ground? In 
the spring of 2008 I was inclined to take the latter view. I recommended that 
the nomination should be inscribed, emphasizing the importance of mäshräp 
for local communities: “Mäshräp are important venues for the performance of 
locally maintained artistic traditions, primarily music (including folk songs and 
Muqam traditions) and dance. Participation in mäshräp demands a wide range 
of locally acquired knowledge, including ritual and religious, linguistic, custom 
and etiquette, norms of hierarchy and reciprocity, and play. As such they are key 
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occasions which provide local communities with a sense of communal identity 
and continuity.”
 I also expressed reservations about the folkloric presentation of the mäshräp, 
in particular, the lack of reference to religious practice. My fellow evaluator, who 
was experienced in heritage matters but not closely acquainted with Xinjiang, 
recommended that the nomination should not be inscribed, citing some tech-
nicalities, and China was asked to resubmit. I was duly invited to examine the 
resubmitted file the following year. But at this point the July 2009 protests and 
subsequent interethnic violence in Ürümchi intervened (Harris and Isa 2011; 
Millward 2009). I was in Ürümchi at the time and experienced firsthand the 
violence on its city streets and the subsequent mass arrests and show trials, as well 
as the heavy police presence and restrictions on many aspects of life, including 
travel, gatherings of people, and religious practice, that were imposed right across 
the region. It seemed to me that in this atmosphere any meaningful safeguard-
ing of mäshräp was simply unfeasible. I recommended against the inscription 
and wrote that in my view “local restrictions on a range of community-based 
religious activities and on large public gatherings could be expected to have a 
direct impact on the viability of mäshräp gatherings. . . . It seems likely that 
this initiative will contribute to the promotion and preservation of folklorized 
representations of mäshräp traditions, while grassroots practice remains subject 
to the threats detailed above.”
 The Chinese submitting party wrote in their response that “in China, people 
of all ethnic groups fully enjoy the freedom in religious belief ” but that mäshräp 
were a “space for traditional cultural practices instead of religious practices.” The 
international jury responsible for assessing applications in that year accepted 
this representation, and the mäshräp was duly inscribed.
A Joyful Song-and-Dance Gathering
Since 2010 we can observe a number of trends in the safeguarding and transmis-
sion of mäshräp. The first is its thoroughgoing transformation into song and 
dance in the hands of the region’s professional troupes.21 News reports welcom-
ing the nomination proclaimed, fancifully, that the meaning of mäshräp in the 
Uyghur language was “joyful place of song-and-dance gathering.”22 Mäshräp 
has now taken its place on the national stage alongside the Uyghur Muqam, the 
Kam Grand Song, and many other items of intangible heritage. The Xinjiang 
song-and-dance troupe and the Muqam Ensemble both developed large-scale 
mäshräp performances involving hundreds of dancers and musicians. Staged 
versions of mäshräp were screened monthly on Xinjiang TV stations. These 
productions draw on aspects of the music, games, and theatrical skits included 
in the thirty-one videos of regional mäshräp and utilize them as fresh material 
for the long-established project of China’s professional minority song-and-dance 
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troupes. Among many other appearances, mäshräp featured prominently in the 
CCTV Fourth Dance competition, and it was screened on national TV as part 
of the annual New Year Gala extravaganza, performed before an audience of 
China’s national leaders.
 The Xinjiang song-and-dance troupe’s Dolan Mäshräp featured an adapted 
version of the Dolan Muqam, with new lyrics by the respected poet Mämtili 
Zunun, sung by the star singer Abdulla Abdurehim. At one level, with its massed 
ranks of smiling, costumed dancers, this production conformed to the well-
rehearsed stereotype of minority performers serving up spectacle for the Han 
audience, displaying their harmonious presence at the heart of the multiethnic 
nation, but on another level it speaks to Uyghur nationalist sentiment. The new 
lyrics expressed a nostalgic identification with mäshräp by these urban cultural 
professionals; this is a proud and emotional re-creation of their Uyghur national 
heritage.
Ana yurtum ara tohpe miras bibaha mäshräp
Boghulghan däm nepeslärgä khipalik sap hawa mäshräp
Yänä yuksäl kuyashtäk parlisun pak ruhi millätning
Baghach eytsun bu alämni esil näghmä nawa mäshräp
Mäshräp, pride of our motherland, our precious heritage.
I draw breath in the pure health-giving air of the mäshräp.
Let the spirit of our nation shine strong like the sun.
Let the noble melody of the mäshräp embrace the whole world.
Figure 4. Dolan mäshräp performed on CCTV. Screenshot from YouTube.
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These lyrics also salute the second trend in the safeguarding of the mäshräp: 
its deployment as an international cultural asset at work as part of state-led 
soft diplomacy initiatives. Thus in March 2013 the Xinjiang song-and-dance 
troupe performed their Dolan Mäshräp in Turkey just as China and Turkey were 
engaged in developing new trade and strategic partnerships.23 This agenda is also 
pursued—in a convergence of neoliberal values and state interests—by privately 
run but well-connected groups such as the Xinjiang Dilinaer Arts Troupe, which 
performed another newly choreographed show, Forever Mäshräp, in Hong Kong 
in 2013. Their promotional literature stated: “Xinjiang Dilinaer Arts Troupe 
aims at uniting various professional arts organizations and cultural arts workers 
to inherit and enhance the traditional arts of the minority groups in Xinjiang. 
Moreover, it also actively communicates with overseas arts organizations and 
artists to strengthen arts exchange activities and introduce the culture and arts 
of Xinjiang to the world.”24
 The rhetoric of “inherit and enhance” in this literature displays direct con-
tinuity with PRC cultural policy, which was developed on the basis of Mao’s 
Talks at the Yan’an Forum in 1942 and which set cultural workers to “revise and 
enrich” China’s traditions. There is also a high degree of continuity in practice; 
the development and rehearsal processes of Forever Mäshräp revealed in a 2013 
media interview indicate the processes of bricolage involved. Pausing from ardu-
ous exercises accompanied by the piano, choreographer Ömärjan Mämtimin, 
freshly graduated from the Beijing Dance Academy, described how he had drawn 
together the special characteristics of no less than seven local traditions in his 
newly created but traditionally rooted mäshräp.25
 As we have seen, transformations of this kind in designated items of intan-
gible heritage are now very familiar across China, from Kunqu opera to Kam 
Grand Song. These items are also a well-recognized phenomenon of initiatives 
around the world. In contemporary scholarship, there is now much greater 
acceptance of these kinds of development, evolution, and change as part of the 
process of safeguarding. It is argued that where traditions are able to evolve 
to reflect new contexts and adopt new influences, this affords them greater 
resilience and adaptability; thus, it may be better for their vitality that they are 
allowed to do so. Many scholars now acknowledge that phenomena of cultural 
tourism and festivalization deserve consideration well beyond any dogmatic 
dismissal that they represent a less “authentic” tradition and therefore one of 
lesser value (Grant 2012). The principal problem with this view is that it places 
the emphasis of the safeguarding initiatives squarely on the discrete item of 
heritage rather than the people who create and maintain it and the immediate 
environment within which it thrived. This problem is certainly not unique to 
Xinjiang. Although the UNESCO convention pays close attention to the involve-
ment and ownership of local communities, issues in this area are commonly 
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reported (Seeger 2009; Foster 2015). Transmitters are often treated more as 
objects than as independent subjects free to develop and re-create their heritage 
on their own terms. They are too often deprived of agency and voice, leaving 
government bodies and heritage brokers to speak on their behalf (Kuah and Liu 
2017; You 2015).
 China’s nominations are often characterized by a narrative of endanger-
ment, loss, and threat due to the forces of Westernization and globalization. The 
UNESCO statement on mäshräp reads: “There are numerous factors endanger-
ing its viability, such as social changes resulting from urbanization and indus-
trialization, the influence of national and foreign cultures, and the migration of 
young Uygur [sic] to cities for work. Frequency of occurrence and the number 
of participants are progressively diminishing, while the number of transmitters 
who understand the traditional rules and rich content of the event has sharply 
decreased from hundreds to tens.”26 This narrative situates the Chinese state as 
protector of its national heritage in the face of modernization and foreign (cul-
tural) incursions. The strategies that aim to “protect and promote” this heritage 
entail top-down initiatives that are implemented as a part of the wider sphere 
of state policies.
 There are, of course, alternative ways of thinking about safeguarding. The 
rhetoric of ecology and sustainability places the emphasis on traditions as liv-
ing cultural and creative practices rather than as heritage to be protected and 
preserved. Jeff Todd Titon (2009), for example, argues that theory and practice 
relating to sustainability should take into account the interdependence of the 
wider ecosystem in which the cultural practice is situated, using ecosystem as “a 
metaphor for an open, interdependent, co-evolving community.” Titon presents 
an ideal model of local participatory art, gift exchanges within social networks, 
operating largely outside the neoliberal economic mainstream. Such ideals are 
clearly distant from the promotion of mäshräp described above, but they are 
clearly acknowledged goals in the UNESCO proclamation, which states that 
communities “play an important role in the production, safeguarding, mainte-
nance and re-creation of the intangible cultural heritage, thus helping to enrich 
cultural diversity and human creativity” (introduction). “This intangible cultural 
heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by 
communities and groups in response to their environment, their interaction 
with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and 
continuity” (Article 2.1).27
 The question of community engagement has been repeatedly raised in the 
discussions surrounding the UNESCO initiative. Anthony McCann cautions 
that “the creators and sustainers of folk and traditional cultures are clearly the 
most important constituency to be considered in formulating policy, for with-
out them there is no living folklore and the crucial role it plays at many points 
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in society.”28 Richard Kurin has argued that communities should be “both the 
subject and object of safeguarding efforts” (2007:15). While mäshräp before 
the nomination adhered closely to Titon’s model of local participatory art, the 
initiatives and developments described above placed mäshräp firmly in the 
hands of national-level, state-led organizations. So what has been happening at 
the grassroots level in Xinjiang since the nomination was approved?
Seeking Grassroots Mäshräp
In the summer of 2012, I returned to a village in southern Xinjiang I had visited 
several times during the 2000s. I had attended several mäshräp there in previ-
ous years, but in 2012 the yigit beshi said that they had not dared to organize 
a mäshräp since our last visit three years before because the local authorities 
would not allow it. “It’s a shame,” he said. “Our young people aren’t learning how 
to play mäshräp anymore. They don’t understand our values; they don’t know 
how to behave.” This conversation took place in the context of the tense climate 
of an antireligious extremism campaign that involved high levels of surveillance 
on many aspects of everyday life and bans on “illegal religious gatherings.”29 It 
was apparent that the local authorities in this rural area were reluctant to sanc-
tion any forms of large-scale gatherings other than those directly organized by 
organs of the state.
 On that occasion, emboldened by the presence of foreigners in the village 
and a visit by a well-known musician from Ürümchi, the yigit beshi decided 
to go ahead. They rigged up electric lights, laid out felt mats, and prepared the 
celebratory polo rice dish for the important guests. Several hundred villagers 
arrived on foot, in donkey carts, and on motorbikes. The musicians played, and 
the people danced. About two hours later, a group of Uyghur policemen arrived 
and told the organizers to halt the proceedings. At the same time, those guests 
who had come from the county town received calls from their work units telling 
them the event was not officially approved and that they should leave. There was 
a tense stand-off, then one of the policemen turned out to be a relative of one of 
the organizers, and a compromise was negotiated: the mäshräp could continue 
for one more hour but must disperse before midnight.
 This, of course, is anecdotal evidence, but it is difficult for the international 
scholarly community to obtain more systematic independent evidence regarding 
the situation of grassroots mäshräp due to a law on intangible heritage adopted 
in 2011. This law requires that both foreign organizations and individuals receive 
approval for survey work from provincial-level agencies. Foreign organizations 
must collaborate with a Chinese partner, who must turn over copies of their 
research results to the agency that approved the project.30 Such tight controls on 
research mirror a general concern in China to control the flow of information to 
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the outside world, while the perceived need for a new law specifically devoted 
to intangible heritage is suggestive of its importance in national policy.
 What is observable, even without the benefit of systematic fieldwork, is the 
way that mäshräp have been harnessed at the local level in the service of specific 
state campaigns. The 2011 law requires that protecting intangible heritage be 
“beneficial to strengthening cultural identification with the Chinese nation, 
beneficial to upholding the unification of the state and ethnic unity, and pro-
moting social harmony.” Accordingly, a song-and-dance mäshräp was organized 
in Ghulja’s town square in 2014 to celebrate “beautiful Ili, harmonious land of 
almonds.” It was attended by a crowd of three thousand people. The performance 
aimed, according to media reports, to promote ethnic unity, social morality, and 
family values.31 In late 2014 online Uyghur-language media reported a “weekly 
mäshräp to tackle extremism” campaign in Aqsu. Ömärjan Hakim, governor of 
Awat County, reported on his blog that in order “to prevent extremist religious 
ideology from infiltrating society and to totally eliminate extremist religious 
activities we organized a series of mäshräp events. All nationalities attended the 
events and praised them. We listened to beautiful music, song, and dance and 
showed our determination to build our beautiful country.”
 Xinjiang Radio reported in April 2015 that 140 cadres had been sent to 
Poskam County to help tackle extremism through measures including a “weekly 
mäshräp to fulfill the people’s spiritual lives.” The report featured photographs 
of a group of village musicians performing in front of the local police station. 
These accounts show that heritage initiatives were being deployed right at the 
heart of a radical mobilization of Uyghur society as part of the antireligious 
extremism campaign.32
Figure 5. A “weekly mäshräp to counter extremism” in front of a police station in 
Poskam County. www.dihan.com.cn, 31 March 2015.
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 A central aspect of UNESCO’s safeguarding policy is the appointment of 
representative transmitters of the cultural heritage, key individuals who should 
be positioned in leading roles of any safeguarding initiative. What is the expe-
rience of these individuals in Xinjiang? Again, systematic evidence is hard to 
obtain, but in 2006 I interviewed two regional-level representative transmitters 
of the Dolan Mäshräp in Aqsu. They told me that the Aqsu Cultural Bureau 
formally recognized the cultural value of the Dolan Mäshräp in 2005 following 
a visit by members of the Xinjiang ICH Center. The officials selected sixteen 
people to perform regular mäshräp in the county town. In these mäshräp they 
played music and performed epizot (dramatic skits) about how the peasants were 
getting rich and about the importance of education and family planning. They 
were giving twice-monthly lessons to local boys, and the local government had 
started paying them a small monthly stipend of 135 RMB.
 A 2015 media report featuring Obulhäsän Ähmät, a national-level repre-
sentative intangible heritage bearer from Qaraqash County in Khotan, shows 
how representative transmitters were also mobilized as part of the antiextremism 
campaign. Best known for his mastery of the dastan (epic poem) Seyit Nochi, 
Obulhäsän was appointed a regional-level heritage bearer by the XUAR party 
committee propaganda bureau in 2007. He started to take part in government-
organized activities and became a grassroots propaganda study group member. 
In 2012 he was appointed national-level representative heritage bearer, with a 
substantial annual salary of 10,000 RMB (more than twice the average annual 
earnings for this impoverished county), and started teaching dastan to a class of 
local boys. According to the media report, this made him grateful to the party 
and the government, and he added extra content to his songs to promote ethnic 
unity and government policies and to tackle extremism. He began to perform 
on a weekly basis outside the mosque, advising people to be modern in their 
thinking and firmly oppose religious extremist thinking.
Community Matters
At the heart of the issues confronted in heritage policy lies the interpretation of 
the term “community,” a notion that is central to many of UNESCO’s proclaimed 
goals. When the UNESCO website proclaims that mäshräp provide communities 
with a sense of identity and continuity, what does “community” mean? Central 
to the understanding of intangible heritage in China is the formulation of com-
munity as a component of national identity. In this way, mäshräp is refigured 
as Chinese-Uyghur national heritage. In this formulation, the mäshräp project 
may be judged successful, a collaboration between Uyghur cultural leaders and 
the Chinese state, with considerable buy-in from Uyghur audiences. However, 
this view of heritage as a national resource or an asset enables governments 
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to claim ownership of the heritage, transforming it into a state-led enterprise, 
encouraging its professionalization and commodification, and appropriating 
its symbolic power for the nation-state. An alternative view of community laid 
out by anthropologist Vered Amit lays emphasis on local identities and places, 
interaction, and shared experiences: “The emotive impact of community, the 
capacity for empathy and affinity . . . arise not just out of an imagined community, 
but in the dynamic interaction between that concept and the actual and limited 
social relations and practices through which it is realized. People care because 
they associate the idea of community with people they know, with whom they 
have shared experiences, activities, places and/or histories” (2002:18). Amit’s 
view of community forged in dynamic interactions echoes the ethnomusico-
logical discussions of participatory music-making discussed above. If we adopt 
this view of community, then the safeguarding of mäshräp is more problem-
atic, as current state security measures in Xinjiang are directly hostile to the 
sustainability of grassroots mäshräp because of its role in creating meaningful 
local community. When the Ili local government took such extreme measures 
to crack down on the new mäshräp in the 1990s, Dautcher suggests that “the 
state felt its legitimacy threatened by any form of community activism it did not 
initiate and control. . . . [T]he state’s vision of civic identity in Xinjiang had no 
place for the neighborhood as a basis for social belonging or grassroots social 
action” (2009:279).
 China’s “safeguarding” of the mäshräp thus involves separating the practice 
from its community roots and promoting versions that represent the national 
community at the expense of local communities. These processes form part of 
a wider context of state policies that are actively engaged in impeding and dis-
rupting local forms of community organization and expression and replacing 
them with state-led initiatives. Intangible heritage initiatives in Xinjiang support 
professional folkloric representations of the heritage, and they press local artists 
who have been appointed as representative transmitters into the service of state 
propaganda campaigns. Arguably, through its inclusion of items like mäshräp 
on its heritage lists, UNESCO is symbolically sanctioning these policies.33 A 
2018 report on Uyghur heritage by the US-based Uyghur Human Rights Proj-
ect makes a series of recommendations to UNESCO, including the suggestion 
that UNESCO should “consider possible consequences for state parties to the 
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage who fail to 
abide by international human rights instruments as referred to in its preamble, 
particularly when those rights violations touch on the very ICH items which 
UNESCO has listed as in need of protection.”34
 As Michael Foster (2015) notes, in theory a national signatory to the conven-
tion is technically in violation of international law if it fails to “take the necessary 
measures to ensure the safeguarding of the intangible cultural heritage present 
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in its territory” (Article 11[a]). In practice, however, no sanctions for such a 
violation have been stipulated, and it is highly unlikely that any sanction would 
be applied against a major UNESCO partner such as China. This is unfortunate 
for Uyghur communities and also for the peace and stability of the region. The 
treatment of mäshräp is not only a problem due to abstract concerns for human 
rights and cultural sustainability. We should listen to the yigit beshi who com-
plained that the youngsters in his village no longer understood their customs. 
By limiting independent local practice and harnessing cultural traditions to 
propaganda initiatives, state policies risk discrediting in the eyes of local com-
munities the very cultural heritage that they purport to safeguard. It is precisely 
in situations like this—where young people are alienated from established com-
munity structures and practices—that they seek out new forms of association 
and absorb new values that may include the very “religious extremism” that 
China’s campaigns are purportedly trying to root out.
Notes
1. In this article I follow the transliteration system for modern Uyghur now widely accepted 
in academic sources and as adopted in Komatsu et al. (2005).
2. UNESCO, “China: Meshrep,” https://ich.unesco.org/en/USL/meshrep-00304 (accessed 17 
April 2019).
3. 少数民族, shaoshu minzu, also translated as “ethnic minorities.”
4. Influences of Sufism range from the continuing presence of organized Naqshbandi orders 
(Zarcone 2001) to popular practices of shrine pilgrimage (Harris and Dawut 2002; Thum 2014).
5. See Adrian Zenz, 2018, “New Evidence for China’s Political Re-education Campaign in
Xinjiang,” China Brief 18(10), https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-for-chinas-political-re 
-education-campaign-in-xinjiang/ (accessed 17 August 2018).
6. The Dolan are a subgroup of the Uyghurs mainly living in the Yarkand and Tarim river areas.
They may be the descendants of indentured serfs brought from the north of the region (Svanberg 
1996).
7. Short video clips can be viewed here: http://www.musicofcentralasia.org/Tracks/Chapter/19 
(accessed 17 April 2019).
8. My friend and colleague Rahile Dawut was detained without charge in December 2017 and
remains in detention at the time of writing. See “Star Scholar Disappears as Crackdown Engulfs 
Western China,” New York Times, 10 August 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/world/
asia/china-xinjiang-rahile-dawut.html (accessed 17 April 2019).
9. https://ich.unesco.org/en/directives (accessed 17 April 2019).
10. https://www.culturalheritagechina.org/ (accessed 17 April 2019).
11. Literally, “goat dragging,” a game played on horseback with a goat carcass, a tradition shared 
by several other ethnic groups and countries. The problems inherent in assigning a cultural practice 
to one ethnic group or one country have been frequently raised; see, for example, Carole Pegg on 
the Chinese/Mongolian khoomii controversy: http://www.akdn.org/akmi/musical-geographies 
-central-asia/carole-pegg (accessed 28 December 2017).
12. Li Changchun, Beijing, February 2006, http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/editorial
.php?issue=007 (accessed 17 April 2019).
13. China Heritage Newsletter, 2 June 2005, China Heritage Project, ANU, http://www.china 
heritagequarterly.org/editorial.php?issue=002 (accessed 17 April 2019).
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14. CASS (26 April 2011) 为了保护和传承新疆维吾尔传统文化: 麦西热甫, http://cel.cssn 
.cn/fwzwhycbh/zgsj/201104/t20110426_2763739.shtml (accessed 17 April 2019).
15. See Jones (2003) and Harris (2008) for further discussion.
16. In the first round of the submission, the word mäshräp was infelicitously transliterated
via the Chinese pinyin, maixilaipu, as “maxirap,” prompting an American colleague involved in 
the examination process to call me up and ask, “Rachel, what on earth is this? It sounds like a kind 
of food wrapping!”
17. CASS, 26 April 2011, 为了保护和传承新疆维吾尔传统文化: 麦西热甫, http://cel.cssn 
.cn/fwzwhycbh/zgsj/201104/t20110426_2763739.shtml (accessed 17 April 2019).
18. Amnesty International Secretariat, 1999, Gross Violations of Human Rights in the Xinjiang 
Uighur Autonomous Region, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3ae6a9eb0.pdf (accessed 17 April 2019).
19. See Anthony Seeger’s (2009) account of ICTM’s involvement in the evaluation process
from 2001 to 2005 and his recommendations concerning the evaluation process.
20. UNESCO, “China: Meshrep,” https://ich.unesco.org/en/USL/meshrep-00304 (accessed
17 April 2019).
21. Song and dance have a particular history in relation to China’s minority peoples, whose
musical traditions have been subject to extensive processes of cultural development since the mid-
twentieth century and whose smiling performers play an important role in symbolically upholding 
PRC rule over minority regions (Gladney 1997; Harris 2017).
22. http://www.china.com.cn/aboutchina/txt/2009–07/12/content_18117975.htm (accessed
17 April 2019).
23. Zan Tao, 25 October 2013, “An Alternative Partner to the West,” Middle East Institute,
http://www.mei.edu/content/alternative-partner-west-turkey%E2%80%99s-growing-relations 
-china (accessed 17 April 2019).
24. 大型歌舞诗《永远的麦西来甫》4 July 2013, http://roll.sohu.com/20130704/
n380662887.shtml (accessed 17 April 2019).
25. Ibid.
26. UNESCO, “China: Meshrep,” https://ich.unesco.org/en/USL/meshrep-00304 (accessed
17 April 2019).
27. UNESCO, “Text of the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heri-
tage,” https://ich.unesco.org/en/convention (accessed 17 April 2019).
28. UNESCO, “Safeguarding Traditional Cultures: A Global Assessment,” https://unesdoc 
.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000132327 (accessed 17 April 2019).
29. For a firsthand account of the ways in which this campaign was impacting on daily life in 
rural Xinjiang in 2012, see Harris (2013).
30. Congressional-Executive Committee on China (16 February 2011), “Draft of Intangible
Cultural Heritage Law Limits Research Activities,” http://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission 
-analysis/draft-of-intangible-cultural-heritage-law-limits-research (accessed 17 April 2019).
31. 天山网: 新疆伊宁县举办大型歌舞麦西来甫 (11 August 2014), http://news.ts.cn/
content/2014–08/11/content_10387716_all.htm (accessed 17 April 2019).
32. Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2015, “Legitimizing Repression: China’s ‘War on Ter-
ror’ under Xi Jinping and State Policy in East Turkestan,” https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/Legitimizing 
-Repression.pdf (accessed 17 April 2015). For more details on the campaign’s use of song and
dance, see Harris (2017) and http://www.soundislamchina.org/?p=1053 (accessed 17 April 2019).
33. Seeger (2009, 2015) emphasizes that UNESCO does not normally provide financial sup-
port for the action plans it ratifies. Once approved, the nation-state can apply for funding, but if it 
does not, there is no further control over how the action plan is implemented.
34. Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2018, “Extracting Cultural Resources: The Exploitation
and Criminalization of Uyghur Cultural Heritage,” https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/CulturalResources 
IntangibleHeritage.pdf (accessed 17 August 2018).
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